As Georgia prepares for its October 26 election, there are growing fears that the country might veer towards authoritarianism, potentially derailing its European Union (EU) aspirations. Despite being granted EU candidate status in December, the process was swiftly halted by Brussels after Georgia introduced a controversial “foreign agents” law. This legislation enhances state power to target non-governmental organizations and media outlets, sparking comparisons to similar laws in Russia.
Former Georgian Dream (GD) party leader and current Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze has fueled concerns by declaring his intention to ban major opposition parties if he secures victory. Kobakhidze, appointed in February following a controversial GD leadership shake-up, has also propagated fears of a “global war party” supposedly aiming to drag Georgia into conflict with Russia. This rhetoric has been interpreted as a rejection of EU and NATO, which Georgia is not a member of.
The opposition, consisting of five main alliances with pro-European and anti-Putin sentiments, has united to challenge the GD’s perceived authoritarian threat. Critics argue that billionaire Bidzina Ivanishvili, founder of the GD party, is driving a shift in Georgian foreign policy towards an anti-Western stance. Ivanishvili, who amassed wealth in Russia and served as prime minister for a short period before 2013, now promotes an anti-Western agenda, claiming that “pseudo-liberal values” will soon be dismantled.
Despite GD’s public support for EU integration, some observers, like Shota Utiashvili from the Georgian Foundation for Strategic and International Studies, believe the party’s EU-friendly rhetoric is a ploy to mislead voters. Utiashvili suggests that the GD is framing the election as a choice between war and peace, rather than EU versus Russia.
Georgia’s historical tensions with Russia, particularly over the regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, add to the volatile climate. Russia’s dominance in these regions and its military presence have exacerbated Georgian fears. A 2020 survey found that many Georgians prioritize reclaiming these territories over EU or NATO membership.
Western diplomats worry that a strong GD majority could lead to a dictatorship, while civil society is increasingly concerned about potential political repression akin to Belarus. Nodar Kharshiladze, founder of the Georgian Analytical Center, warned that electoral fraud could spark protests and violence, especially among younger, politically active citizens.
George Melashvili of the Europe Georgia Institute fears that Ivanishvili’s ultimate goal is the total suppression of opposition and consolidation of a one-party state. The threat of violence following the election remains a significant concern.
In late August, Sergey Narshkin, head of Russia’s Foreign Intelligence Service, hinted at possible Russian intervention if the GD party does not win. However, many in Tbilisi view this as mere rhetoric, with security experts like Utiashvili noting that Russia’s military capacity to intervene is limited due to its ongoing commitments in Ukraine.
